TyroCity: International Relations and Diplomacy Notes

History of diplomacy

International Relations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

As soon as people organized themselves into separate social groups, the necessity of regularizing contacts with representatives of other groups became apparent. Even the earliest civilizations had rules for interaction.

Early Development
The first civilization to develop an orderly system of diplomacy was ancient Greece. Ambassadors and special missions were sent from city to city to deliver messages and warnings, to transfer gifts, and to plead the cases of their own people before the rulers of other city-states. These diplomatic missions, however, were occasional and sporadic.

With the decline of Greece and the rise of the Roman Empire, the Greek system of diplomacy disappeared. As Rome expanded, its diplomacy served the purposes of conquest and annexation. The Romans were not inclined to coexist with other states on the basis of mutual interests. Rome issued commands; it did not negotiate.

For almost a thousand years after the fall of Rome, Europeans thought of themselves not as members of separate nations but rather as members of smaller groups vaguely bound to some feudal overlord. Although localities had relations from time to time, no record exists of any formal diplomatic practices during the middle Ages.

Renaissance (New start of) Diplomacy
Modern diplomacy had its origins during the Italian Renaissance. Early in the 15th century, a group of city-states developed in Italy, but none could dominate the rest, and all feared conquest by the others. The rulers of most of the city-states gained their positions through force and cunning. Because they could not count on the loyalty of their subjects, these rulers hoped to maintain allegiance by seeking foreign conquest and treasure. They sought opportunities to increase their power and expand their domain and were always concerned about the balance of power on the Italian Peninsula.

Although Renaissance diplomacy was especially vicious and amoral, the Italian city-states developed a number of institutions and practices that still exist: (1) They introduced a system of permanent ambassadors who represented the interests of their states by observing, reporting, and negotiating. (2) Each state created a foreign office that evaluated the written reports of the ambassadors, sent instructions, helped to formulate policies, and kept vast records. (3) Together they developed an elaborate system of protocol, privileges, and immunities for diplomats. Ambassadors and their staffs were granted freedom of access, transit, and exit at all times. Local laws could not be used to impede an ambassador in carrying out duties, but ambassadors could be held accountable if they actually committed crimes, such as theft or murder. (4) The concept of extraterritoriality was established. Under this principle, an embassy in any state stood on the soil of its own homeland, and anyone or anything within the embassy compound was subject only to the laws of its own country.

Diplomacy in the European State System
The rise of nation-states in 17th-century Europe led to the development of the concepts of national interest and the balance of power. The former concept meant that the diplomatic objectives of nations should be based on state interests and not on personal ambition, rivalries, sentiment, religious doctrine, or prejudice. For example, gaining access to raw materials was in the national interest. The balance of power theory was based on a general interest in maintaining the state system by seeking equilibrium of power among the most powerful nations. That diplomacy could be used to pursue both sets of interests was soon apparent. Increasingly, the presence of the major powers became a staple in international politics. Although small countries might disappear, as Poland did when it was partitioned in the 18th century, the great powers sought to manage their relations without threatening one another’s survival. At the same time, European diplomats were becoming increasingly professional and learned. The seamier side of diplomacy—the bribing, lying, and deceiving—was gradually replaced by a code of expected and acceptable conduct.

The European system of diplomacy suffered its first shock when Napoleon attempted to conquer Europe in the early 19th century. After Napoleon’s defeat, the European system was “restored,” and no major wars occurred for the next hundred years.

The New Diplomacy
In 1914 the countries of Europe were thrust into another violent confrontation. The carnage of World War I brought the European system of diplomacy into disrepute. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was the chief critic of the European diplomatic system and the proponent of a new type of open diplomacy and collective security. Wilson’s primary targets were the theory and practice of the balance of power, the distinction between great and small powers, the pursuit of national interests, secret agreements and treaties, and professional diplomats.

In place of the old system Wilson offered a “new diplomacy” in his Fourteen Points. Open covenants would be drafted in international conferences with great and small countries participating on an equal basis. Peace would be maintained by making national boundaries coincide with ethnic boundaries. All members of the international community would pledge to fight for these boundaries against any nation that used force to change them. Countries would pursue community interests instead of national interests and submit their disputes with each other to international arbitration for peaceful resolution.

Many of Wilson’s ideas were incorporated into the 1919 Treaty of Versailles (see Versailles, Treaty of) and the League of Nations. After the United States rejected the league and returned to a policy of isolationism, however, the European states reverted to the balance of power system and the pursuit of national interests through professional diplomats.

During World War II, the U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt again sought to establish a new type of diplomacy, but he and the British prime minister Winston Churchill built the postwar international order on the basis of agreements with the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin that conformed more to the old European system than to the new ideas embodied in the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations. Although the United Nations remains a symbol of what a new diplomatic system might be, international politics since the end of World War II has adhered closely to the European model and has, in part, returned to some of the worst aspects of Renaissance diplomacy.

Nepal‘s role in SAARC

International Relations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

Eric Hobsbawm has defined periods of history in terms of ages, Age of revolutions, of Capital, of Empires and of Extremes etc. By this analogy, our age can be called an “Age of Contrasts” which is the sum total of interdependence and marginalization, abundant prosperity and anxiety, technological revolutions and exclusion. This is the reality we live in.

Similarly, the present time also reminds us of what John Dunne had said about four centuries and a half ago, “No man is an island unto himself, every man is a piece of the continent, but part of the main”. It rings as true today as it was then. South Asia therefore is no exception to this general trend. In fact we are a microcosm of the world at large. The region enjoys a high growth rate but has one of the lowest Social indicators with incidence of poverty. It has a high potential of human and natural resources, yet it faces the great challenge of deprivation and marginalization. It is in that overall context that we would like to look at the SAARC process.

Before going to the specifics, let me state at the beginning that SAARC has gone through the vicissitudes of time in the last two decades. We have passed through moments of euphoria and also moments of frustrations. We are striving hard to gear up slowly towards the objectives of the SAARC. Let us also remind ourselves that SAARC holds a great promise only when we are all able to fully implement what we have agreed in various SAARC forums, and only when we practice what we preach.

South Asia at this point of time is at the crossroads. Globalization has really come to our door with all its attendant characteristics, both opportunities as well as challenges. The overall growth rate of the region has remained high for some years and there is a prospect of getting it even to a higher level and sustaining it at that level, if we all manage distributive effects of growth, infrastructure constraints and well-calibrated and visionary integration with the rest of the world. South Asia has also teeming millions, who are deprived and marginalized and hence have not been able to enjoy the fruits of this overall macro-level prosperity. There are problems of imbalances of growth, unemployment, violence and marginalization. Though such problems are of different nature and of different magnitude in each of the south Asian county, a humane and inclusive development strategy with high and sustainable growth is what every country is striving to achieve. And that has to be seen against the global trends and global reality.

That brings me to the core issues of SAARC, namely economic cooperation, cooperation in social fields, cooperation in poverty alleviation, cooperation in other areas of mutual advantage.

We are all aware that that there is no finality in the sequence between the economic and social cooperation and its impact on making political environment more conducive or vice versa. We have seen both the routes being equally effective. Each region has to deal with its own internal dynamics depending upon the intensity of the issues involved in that particular region. However, we all know that they reinforce each other if they move in tandem. We all must be a1le to look beyond the present and take a longer-term view so that we would be able to ensure peace, security and prosperity in the region and uplift the quality of life of the people as envisaged by the SARRC Charter.

We have also reached an important point of time at the moment. We have finally brought all the countries of geographic and historic South Asia together by having Afghanistan as our member. It is also very important from both short term as well as long-tent perspectives that we are having a number of observers from the neighboring region as well as beyond. These two events are very significant for SAARC and we hope that it would help us inject a new dynamism in the region for an enhanced level of effective cooperation and further promote regional consciousness.

Economic Cooperation

We are all aware that if we want to really touch the lives of the people and ensure them peace, security and prosperity as enshrined in the charter, economic cooperation should receive the highest prominence within the SAARC framework. History, geography, culture and now our common economic and social challenges have bound us together. Of late, the world has been fiercely competitive, and globalization has changed the world into a prospective single market for all, Cut-throat competition, global outsourcing, component trading, seamless flow between production and consumption, and the fast pace of changing taste and fashion are some of the defining features of the global trade today. And its intensity shows no sign of abating. On the contrary, it would be deeper and wider as we see the interplay of further liberalization drive through WTO negotiations and uninterrupted revolutions in science and technology. In this context, regional trade provides us with two important prospects. One is that geographical proximity still makes the bilateral trade more beneficial among the neighbors, as transaction costs become lower and the countries in the neighborhood enjoy the familiarity with the quality1 taste and the purchasing trend and power of the people. Besides, the South Asian community has a very large market within itself. Secondly, the robust regional trade helps the individual countries and their economic units to prepare better for the fierce competition at the global level as they share more strength, experience and the economies of scale through regional trade not only in production and marketing capacity but also in meeting standards and dealing with obstructive non-tariff and pan-tariff measures. Thirdly, regional economic cooperation and deeper integration are gaining in strength even in the regions that were riot that much involved in these endeavors before, such as Mercosur in Latin America, SADCC and COMESA in Africa. This is a general trend at the moment.

Despite our best efforts, SAFTA is yet to be operationalized and we are losing time and opportunity. It is illogical for a region that is enjoying so high an economic growth rate and so vibrant an economy to have less than five percent of its total trade within the region. We all know that there is more competition than complementarity in our products but as per the principles of comparative advantage, we could gain more by intensifying trade within the region through specialization and diversification, which would ensure benefits to all. Similarly, a the nature of trade and global financial markets go through transformation fuelling economic growth around the world, we must also look beyond the core sector of trade in goods and include cooperation in all trade facilitation measures such as services, investment, infrastructure, non tariff barriers including macro economic policies1 It is through the right mix of these factors that we can get due benefits from economic cooperation. Now we are glad to see that the energy issues are slowly coming to SAARC for discussion and cooperation. An important South Asia Energy Dialogue took place in March 2007 in New Delhi. South Asian border-crossings are more cumbersome than that of many other regions. Many studies have shown that the physical and non-physical barriers need to be reduced, as smooth connectivity would be indispensable for such activities. The cost of non-cooperation and benefits of cooperation in South Asia have been thoroughly analyzed innumerable times by many specialists and we should not be oblivious to those hard facts. Nepal strongly feels that we have a lot of stake in promoting economic cooperation in a comprehensive manner, but also in such a way that all share the fruits of cooperation on an equitable basis. The expansion of the capacity of the least developed countries among them should receive due priority. Otherwise such cooperation would not take off and even if it takes off, it would not be sustainable.

Cooperation in Social Sector

This is another area that needs our urgent and effective attention. We are all aware of the not so good record of this region on social issues. Low literacy rate, poverty, low health standards vulnerability or children, gender discrimination and exclusion are indeed serious constraints to harmonious development and prosperity in South Asia. We should concentrate our minds on how we can best coordinate our individual policies on these fronts, how we complement national programs with regional linkages and how we should not only devise but also execute effective regional programs. We have agreed to various action plans and programs to uplift the status of the targeted and vulnerable groups. Sharing of best practices, common standards in identifying and comparing the situations, bringing regional synergy in social programs have occupied our discussions of late. But when it comes to the effect on the ground of regional cooperation in these sectors, they are at best tentative, at worst non-existent. Therefore recent decision relating to the commencement of specific projects under the SAARC development fund is of great significance and indeed is a welcome sign. We must make sure that the projects are effective on the ground and they really bring about a change in the lives of the common man. We also hope that the other windows of the SDF would soon come into operation in an effective manner. This should therefore create additional momentum to our national efforts and also should work as an effective bridge between national programs and international cooperation.

We only hope that the decade of implementation as agreed during the thirteenth SAARC Summit is linked up with the decade of poverty reduction. The 22 SAARC development goals and elaboration of their indicators and monitoring mechanism are important addition to our collective commitment, but we should make efforts to translate them into reality with dedicated programs. Social issues are important not only for their own sake and not only from the perspective of human development, they are also important if we do not want to lay to waste precious human resources and wish to do away with violent internal conflicts and insurgency in the region! Therefore perhaps we should look at the social issues more seriously in a comprehensive manner. SAARC could look at how conflicts and violence fuelled by marginalization and exclusion have ravaged our region as a whole, even though they are of different magnitude and of different nature in each country in South Asia. As it has undermined the lives of the people throughout the region, this should be studied in a holistic manner within the framework of SAARC. There could be lessons that could be learned from each other on this issue as well.

Similarly, in other areas of cooperation, the first meeting of the SAARC home ministers has taken place in order to address the menace of terrorism and drug trafficking more effectively. Similarly, first meeting of finance ministers was also held and instructed IGEG to develop modalities for expeditious and time-bound realization of the mandate of SAARC economic union.

Relationship with Agencies and International Organizations

We are glad that interactions with the international organizations have increased over the years. It has two fold objectives. It provides us with technical expertise in the respective fields. Because of their long experience in their specialized areas, it propels us more towards creating a regional synergy in our projects as they start developing more inter- country operations. We all know that they cannot be a substitute for regional projects, but they can play an important complementary role in giving the necessary support for regional cooperation. One of the major stumbling blocks in the SAARC process in terms of deepening cooperation in the region has been the lack of regional projects. So far what we have is cooperation on the soft side, which is sharing of best practices, studies and meetings of technical experts. They are important to establish facts and understand the region better. However, what is now required is how to implement those common programs which would have a visible impact on the ground in terms of changing the lives of the people. The studies and fields of cooperation with the international organizations is expected to help us have a wider perspectives and also to initiate effective programs of cooperation. We would continue to strengthen our relationship with such organizations to improve our conditions as per the objectives of the Charter.

People-to-people Contacts and Business Contacts

One of the most important features of SAARC has been that it has opened up vast possibilities for people to people contacts through various associations of regional character. There is now more sense of regional identity than before; there are more contacts among the professionals of the region. Among them, the role and influence of the SAARC chamber of commerce and SAARC level think tanks have been more visible. They have created a distinct space for themselves and we are glad that they are coming forward with innovative ideas to give the strong popular character to this regional consciousness. We know that there are still many areas in which we can further promote people to people contacts by facilitating their interactions in a most comprehensive manner. We greatly value all such initiatives, as it helps us to look at different issues afresh.

Political Consultations

Though the charter does not provide for discussions on contentious issues and bilateral issues, informal political consultation process during the SAARC summit meeting has taken on its own life over the years. The practice of organizing retreats during the summit for a free wheeling discussions on all issues of importance, and the forum that the SAARC summit provides for bilateral consultations on the sidelines have been very useful to break the deadlock, as well as warming up relationship in times of difficulties. Considering the history of relationship among the South Asian countries, this provides an easy forum to engage in discussions without elaborate preparations and constraints of full-fledged bilateral visits. To what extent this process has contributed to crack the hard knots is a moot question, but it could certainly create a better atmosphere for serious negotiations.

Conclusion

We are glad that the forthcoming SAARC summit is taking up some of the issues outlined above. We are also talking about a vision for the third decade of SAARC. We are aware that there are a lot of expectations of the people from the process. We fully share that. And it is also a fact that there is much to be desired in terms of its impact on the ground, even though we have made a good progress on the conceptual clarity of our vision for a peaceful, cooperative and prosperous South Asia. We went through our infancy and adolescence and we are now at the young age of 21. And like anyone at that age, we must have an indomitable spirit, an ambitious vision and a vibrant energy to pursue our goals and objectives. Nepal will play its due role in taking the SAARC process forward with commitment and clarity. And I am hopeful that other members would also take it in that spirit, look around and move ahead with the times, with open eyes and an open heart.

Causes & Origin of Cold War

International Relations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

1. Immediate Causes

Opposing Ideologies: Once common Enemies defeated (Germany); tension escalate.

The Soviets sought to introduce their brand of communism to nations and territories that they occupied as a result of the war.

The United States and the other Western European nations viewed communism and one‐party rule in a very negative light; as a direct threat to individual freedom and democracy

East–West ideological differences soon manifested themselves in Germany, which was split into western and eastern occupation zones in 1945.

The Atomic Bomb:

SU upset that their allies had tried to keep the technology a secret;

American atomic monopoly might create a serious security problem along their western border.

Strategic Imperatives and Power Vacuums; As the number of newly independent states proliferated in the postwar world as the result of decolonization, the US and Soviet Union competed for influence over these new states.

US adopted the policy of checking the Soviet expansion.

Economics: The Soviets held out the promise that communism would bring an end to economic deprivation and inequality.

The United States convince Europeans that democratic capitalism offered the only acceptable way of achieving economic success and freedom.

Leadership and Personalities: In April 1945, just a month before the defeat of Germany, President Franklin D. Roosevelt died, and Vice President Harry S. Truman became the new leader of the United States.

Roosevelt’s style of wartime diplomacy with Stalin had been very personal and informal; compromise and postponed making difficult postwar decisions.

Truman’s leadership style was far more forceful and direct than was Roosevelt’s.

2. Intermediate Causes:

Foreign Policies of the 1930s: Hitler annexed Austria in March 1938, the French, British, and Soviets entered into negotiations to form an alliance or mutual defense pact.

negotiations broke down by mid‐1939 because of mutual suspicions and misunderstandings.

Just as the Munich Agreement 1938, angered the Soviets, the August 1939 Nazi‐Soviet Non‐Aggression Pact outraged the West.

The Soviets stayed out of the war until they were attacked by Germany in June 1941.

The World War II alliance of the allies was based not on long‐term trust or even long‐term mutual interests. It was based only on the will to defeat a common enemy.

War Damage and the Soviet Union

Stalin and his successors believed that their country would have suffered much less damage and far fewer deaths had its allies dedicated more resources to the World War II effort in Europe.

mutual distrust soon replaced mutual cooperation after the Axis nations were defeated.

After the war was over, Stalin felt entitled to control Eastern Europe

He believed that the great suffering and sacrifices made by the Soviets had earned him the right to establish pro‐Soviet regimes from Yugoslavia all the way to the Polish‐Soviet border.

He sought dominance there for ideological as well as security reasons. mistrust developed with the way Allied Conduct of World War II.

3. Long‐term Causes

Western Interference in the Russian/ Bolshevik Revolution (1918–1921)

In January–February 1918, Great Britain, the United States, and France decided to intervene in the Russian Revolution of November 1917. The revolution led ultimately to a civil war.

Britain, America, France, Japan, and several other Western nations sent troops to Russia to stop the Bolsheviks. By 1921, the Bolsheviks had consolidated their power and the West ended its intervention and blockade.

The deeply resented the West’s intervention in what was clearly an internal affair. This history weighed heavily on East–West relations.

Soviet Security Concerns: history of Invasion;

Stalin’s desire to establish a defensive perimeter in Eastern Europe contributed to the eventual clash with the West.

Long‐term Consequences of Cold War

International Relations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

Proxy Wars: Vietnam War, African Decolonization Movements, and Afghan Crisis

Proxy wars were fought throughout the developing world

During 1961–1973, the United States gradually escalated its involvement in the Vietnam War.

Vietnam was divided into North and South regions after its decolonization in 1954. North Vietnam came under communist influence while US backed South

Gradually nationalistic forces from the North that aimed to unify Vietnam began to encroach into the South. The Americans saw it as a communist threat and began to provide military support to the south.

The U.S. government withdrew its military in the early 1970s. The U.S. effort to prevent a communist takeover in South Vietnam failed.

In other parts of the world, but most notably in Africa, post–World War II decolonization movements witnessed both the Americans and Soviets competing for influence.

This superpower rivalry either precipitated regional or civil wars or greatly prolonged conflicts already in progress. Such was the case in Congo (Zaire), Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, among other African states.

Millions of people died in these wars mainly because of genocide, forced relocations, and starvation.

In late 1970s Afghanistan experienced a sort of revolution. A communist government was installed in power in Afghanistan

The US, USSR and China all had vested interests in Afghanistan due to its oil.

But anti‐communist force in collaboration with the religious fundamentalist forces opposed the new government. As a result Afghanistan plunged into a civil War.

In this civil war the USA supported the anticommunists and the fundamentalists (mujahedeen) via Pakistan. On the other hand, the communist government sought military and economic aid from the USSR.

The war was a disaster for the Soviet Union. USSR ultimately withdrew in 1990.

UNO vs. League of Nations

International Relations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

The U.N.O. is a much wider organization than the League of Nations was. In fact, the League during the years between the two wars, (1919-1939) almost became a forum of imperialist powers, an instrument to maintain their own interests and resolve, if possible, their imperialist conflicts. The U.N.O. is a more representative body. The U.S.S.R. is one of the original and permanent members along with the imperialist powers.

Secondly, the Security Council takes decisions by seven votes including five permanent members while the League Council took decisions by unanimity. Even a small state could bloc the work of the League even if all the big powers and most of the states were in agreement. That cannot happen in the Security Council. On the other hand, its decisions are assured at only by agreement between permanent members.

The U.N.O. also enjoys an advantage over the League in so far as Asian and African states have come into existence and always throw their weight on the side of peace forces. The imperialist countries and states with aggressive designs cannot have an easy run. All decisions are to be taken on the basis of the unanimity of big five powers. Entire possibility of peace and war has been thrown on their shoulders.

The principle of unanimity has got its own benefits. Now no major power can have shelter behind the veto of a small state as was the case with the League of Nations when one hostile vote of Portugal made the League ineffective to take any action against Italy when she attacked Abbyssinia. In fact, the U.N.O. today takes decisions which arc unfavorable at time to the interests of these powers.

The economic and social functions of the U.N.O. have been separated from political and legal functions. In case of the League these were blurred. Similarly, the Trusteeship Council is a distinct improvement over the mandatory system of the League. Today the forces of peace are more powerful than those during the inter-war period. The U.N.O. thus functions under better conditions. That is the reason why the U.N.O. has been able to maintain peace for four decades or so.

The League of Nations and the United Nations

The imposition of a peaceful world order was a key objective for the League of Nations, established in the aftermath of World War One. How can its successor, the United Nations, react to the challenges of the 21st century? Charles Townshend assesses its chances.

The birth of the League ideal

The League of Nations, born of the destruction and disillusionment arising from World War One, was the most ambitious attempt that had ever been made to construct a peaceful global order. It was rooted in a comprehensive liberal critique of the pre-war international system, which was widely believed to have been the cause of the carnage of 1914-18.

The idea of the League was to eliminate four fatal flaws of the old European states: in place of competing monarchical empires – of which the Hapsburg Empire was perhaps the most notorious – the principle of national self-determination would create a world of independent nation states, free of outside interference; the secret diplomacy of the old order would be replaced by the open discussion and resolution of disputes; the military alliance blocs would be replaced by a system of collective guarantees of security; and agreed disarmament would prevent the recurrence of the kind of arms race that had racked up international tensions in the pre-war decade.

Before this, the closest approach to an international political structure had been the Congress System, in which the European great powers held occasional summit meetings to discuss issues they found urgent. (To his credit, the much-maligned Tsar Nicholas II of Russia had sponsored international efforts to ban ‘inhumane’ weapons such as expanding or exploding bullets; but these efforts were only partially successful.)

The surviving victorious great powers at the end of the Great War – Britain and France – would have preferred to go no further than regularising the old Congress System. The spirit of the times, however, which was overbearingly personified in the president of the USA, Woodrow Wilson, pushed towards the creation of a more comprehensive global organisation, which would include all independent states, and in which even the smallest state would have a voice.

The growth of a system

America failed to ratify the League Covenant Unfortunately, Wilson’s thinking about the way that self-determination would work in the real world, and about getting his idea for a ‘community of power’ off the ground, remained vague. Partly this was to avoid alarming US isolationist opinion, but in any case, when the League Covenant was agreed at the Paris peace conference in 1919, the US Senate refused to ratify it.

How the League would have worked with American participation remains one of the great ‘what ifs’ of modern history. As it was, the direction of the system was left in the hands of states – primarily Britain and France – whose altruism was questionable and whose economic resources had been crippled by the war

Yet the League of Nations did work surprisingly well, at least for a decade after the war. By December 1920, 48 states had signed the League Covenant, pledging to work together to eliminate aggression between countries. A series of disputes – between Germany and Poland over Upper Silesia, between Italy and Greece, and between Greece and Bulgaria – were resolved under its auspices.

Though relatively minor, these were just the kind of incidents that had in the past triggered regional conflicts – and indeed World War One itself. There was a widespread belief, or hope, that the League’s prestige was growing incrementally. Methods of investigating disputes, and helping to keep the peace, were regularised.

Another crucial function was the establishment of Mandates to bring all the territories that had been liberated from German and Turkish rule, at the end of the Great War, to eventual self-determination. In Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, the process seemed to be moving steadily forward. (In view of its subsequent history, the formal admission of Iraq to the League in 1933 was indeed premature.) The machinery of the League organisation grew more substantial, and the secretariat began to carve out the basis for a quasi-independent role, although this was unplanned and unlooked-for by the old great powers.

The proliferation of League activity, however, carried risks: as one of its founders, Lloyd George, put it, ‘it had weak links spreading everywhere and no grip anywhere’. ‘Grip’ ultimately meant the capacity to use force. When the crucial concept of collective security was put to the acid test in the 1930s, it dissolved. Once big powers started to challenge the status quo, as Japan did in Manchuria, the League found it practically impossible to reach a clear verdict on who was guilty of ‘aggression’.

Or, still more disastrously, in the case of Italian pressure on Abyssinia, the guilt was clear enough but the key powers, Britain and France, were unwilling to antagonise the guilty party because of their wider strategic fears. The failed attempt to impose an oil embargo on Italy demonstrated that any credible system of economic sanctions was far distant.

Death and transfiguration?

Like the proverbial old soldier, the League never died, but rather faded away. Between the humiliation of seeing one of its members, Austria, taken over by Germany in 1938 without even a formal protest, and the absurdity of expelling the USSR after the outbreak of World War Two in 1939 (an event that neither the USSR nor the League were involved in), all that remained were such wraithlike undertakings as the British Mandate in Palestine.

When the Allies finally began to prepare for the end of World War Two, they rejected any idea of restoring the League, and instead moved to establish a new organisation, the United Nations (UN). The structure of the United Nations was to give a much stronger position to the traditional great powers through the UN Security Council; the most significant thing about its creation, perhaps, is that this time the USA did not back away.

A significant number of the old League’s aims and methods were transmitted into the new organisation in 1945. Among these were not only such low-key but effective institutions as the International Court and the International Labour Organisation, but also the working assumptions of the secretariat, and some key operations – including those that would soon come to be called ‘peacekeeping’ operations.

The UN may have almost stumbled sideways into its peacekeeping role, but the motive and sustaining force in the process was the survival – and the strengthening – of the expectation of international involvement in the preservation of global security. Gradually this came to include the defence of human rights as well as the resolution of territorial conflict. The UN’s first attempt to resolve a serious conflict, in Palestine in 1947-8, was unsuccessful, even disastrous: it failed to implement its own partition plan, and its special mediator was assassinated.

None-the-less, UNTSO (the UN Truce Supervision Organisation) opened the gates to a wave of – often bafflingly labelled – successors: UNMOGIP, UNEF, UNOGIL, UNFICYP, UNIMOG, ONUMOZ, UNPROFOR. Some, like the observer force in Kashmir, have remained active for 50 years: not evidence of brilliant success, admittedly, but evidence of hard necessity and a degree of usefulness at least.

Other UN organisations had a shorter but more spectacular life: notably the Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964, which prefigured the alarming future for missions to states that were dissolving into civil war. In the Congo, the UN found itself using military force against Katangan rebels to preserve the unity of the state of Congo – a departure from the principle of strict neutrality which has usually been thought vital to the success of its peacekeeping missions.

Dealing with such internal conflict was a far more ambitious and demanding task than the traditional role of assisting consenting states to observe ceasefires. In effect it showed that the UN might need to take governmental responsibility in some situations.

A new international age?

The development towards taking responsibility in countries at risk of disintegration, was due to a dramatic increase in the prestige and initiative of the UN Secretary-General. This was especially at the time when the position was held by the charismatic Dag Hammarskjöld – from 1953 until his death in a plane crash in the Congo in 1961. The UN secretariat came to represent the apparent ‘democratisation’ of the organisation, as the General Assembly began to assert itself after a decade of US domination. (A vivid insight into how this American pressure operated can be found in Conor Cruise O’Brien’s To Katanga and Back.)

What some have called the ‘third world UN’ emerged out of the shadow of the ‘cold war UN’, to the horror of conservative American opinion, which had expected the UN to function as a vehicle for US values – or in effect US policy.

The end of the cold war triggered an unprecedented upsurge in UN commitments. Despite the recurrent funding problems, of the kind that had also dogged the old League, the upbeat official view was that the organisation’s prestige had never been so high. But the nature of the problems emerging in the last decade of the 20th century was extremely worrying.

The title ‘nation’ had always been (for both League and UN) a polite fiction for a club of sovereign states, who often contained within them various ethnically diverse minority groups, sometimes with a claim to nationhood in their own right. These states often denied the rights of their constituent nations to self-determination, and the breakdown of such states as Lebanon, Yugoslavia, and Somalia during the 1990s, revealed a maelstrom of elemental national forces. These could not be compartmentalised into old-fashioned sovereign states of the kind that the UN exists to guarantee, leaving the organisation unsure of how to treat them.

The challenge ahead

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder of the Islamic group Hamas Still more worrying was the explosive upsurge of terrorist violence, which in many places has dissolved the shape of military conflict in ways that make the traditional methods of monitoring ineffective. If there is to be a new age of terrorism, it can only be countered by the development of international – indeed global – security agencies. Only the UN could provide a framework for these; yet the possibility of taking effective measures is likely to be frustrated by the difficulty of finding a common definition of terrorism.

The League of Nations tried to draw up a Convention against Terrorism the 1930s, and could not get general agreement. The wider circumstances of that time were unpropitious, but the basic problem persists: as President Assad of Egypt told Tony Blair, in the wake of the attack on New York on September 11 2001, labelling is inescapably a political act. Members of Hamas (the Islamic resistance movement), and the Islamic Jihad organisation, may be terrorists to the government of Israel, but to others they are fighters against oppression. Does the UN have the ‘grip’ to impose a common view?

General Theory of International Relations

International Relations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

The first thesis
A general theory of international relations needs to deal with the relationships between at least three fundamental concepts: Structure, Purpose and Situation. Power, and restraints on power, will be considered as subsidiary concepts. Structure- not just as nation but all other influential factors.

The second thesis
A general theory of international relations needs to permit of a multiplicity of viewpoints ranging from that of a responsible member of a particular group at a particular time (say, the Secretary of State of the United States today) to one that approximates, as far as may be possible, to that of a hypothetical observer from Mars studying the emergent characteristics of an interacting system of many cultures, races, states, classes, etc., over the full course of history.

The third thesis
A general theory of international relations needs to deal with two realms: the realm of fact and the realm of value — of “should” propositions — and with the interrelations between these realms. In almost every problem of international politics the first question to be asked is, in the particular context, who is to be regarded as the “we” and who is to be regarded as the “they.” The Phenomena of External and Internal Means of Balance of Power: Alliances
serving as external means and Increased armaments as internal balance of power. The recent world order in terms of economy, ideology and political system are becoming just as aspect of purpose. The means-ends concepts works better in international relation.

Peace treaty of versailles

International Relations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

The Treaty of Versailles is a peace document signed at the end of World War I by the Allied and Associated Powers and by Germany in the Palace of Versailles, France, on June 28, 1919; it took force on January 10, 1920.

Background of First World War
Major Causes of World War I
Growth in German power and ambition: Although Germany did not become a unified country until 1871, it prospered and used its growing wealth to create military power. Britain was concerned that the growth in German power would threaten its dominance on the sea. Hence, it established formal ties with France and Russia. Since the European powers started to gang up against Germany, it sought more armaments and closer relations with Austria‐Hungary.
Arms races and nationalism: Germany expanded its naval weapon which seemed to threaten Britain’s dominance of the seas so essential for maintaining the British Empire. The alliance system and the tensions generated by the arms races fueled nationalism all over Europe, which in turn intensified tensions and mutual suspicions. German nationalism focused on achieving a world empire to match the country’s growing economic and military might. France, Russia, and Austria‐ Hungary also had their own agenda influenced by the ideology of nationalism. Slavic nationalism threatened Austria‐Hungary; Russian nationalism placed pressure on Russia to aid Serbia because
many Serbians and Russians shared common ethnicity; French nationalism demanded the return of its lost provinces of Alsace‐Lorraine.
Colonial rivalries: For many centuries, European nations built empires. Colonies supplied European nations with raw materials and provided markets for manufactured goods. As Germany industrialized it competed directly with France and Britain to gain colonies. Major European countries also competed for land in Africa.

Formation of peacetime alliances: By 1907 there were two major defense alliances in Europe. The Triple Entente, later known as the Allies, consisted of France, Britain, and Russia. The Triple Alliance, later known as the Central Powers, consisted of Germany, Austria‐Hungary, and Italy (Soon joined by the Ottoman Empire). Once Russia acted in response to Austria’s attack on Serbia, alliance commitments pulled one European great power after another into the war.

World War I – Major Events
World War I took place for four years and three months between 1914 and 1918. The war killed more than 18 million people and the total cost was nearly $333 billion. The Great War began as a local collision between Serbia and Austria‐Hungary. Bosnia was controlled by Austria‐Hungary and a Serbian group was fighting to free Bosnia from Austria‐Hungary and make it a part of Serbian kingdom. The war was triggered when Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg throne of Austria, was assassinated in Sarajevo (Bosnia), by a Serbian terrorist organization that wanted Bosnia to be free of Austria‐Hungary and to become part of a large Serbian kingdom. Bosnia had been thesite of numerous plots against Austria‐Hungary’s Hapsburg rulers, especially after 1908 when Bosnia Herzegovina was annexed by Austria‐Hungary. Austria‐Hungary placed the blame for the assassination directly on Serbia. Austria‐Hungary also saw the crisis as an opportunity to deal with Serbia once and for all.

Austrian leaders wanted to attack Serbia but feared Russian intervention on Serbia’s behalf since Russia (having a large Slavic population) had public pressure to defend fellow Slavs in Serbia and elsewhere from Austria‐Hungary’s threats. Hence, Austria‐Hungary wanted German assistance with a hope that the German commitment would prevent Russia from entering the conflict. Some historians argue that at least some of Germany’s leaders did not hope to deter Russia, but they actually hoped that war would begin so that Germany could defeat Russia before Russia’s growing military power made it a serious threat to Germany. On July 25th, 1914, Austria‐Hungary mobilized
its army, and three days later declared war on Serbia. Russia decided to support Serbia and Germany declared for Austria‐Hungary. Russia was also upset with Austria‐Hungary for its failure to perform the deal they had made in 1908 in which Russia would not raise any voice against the annexation of Bosnia‐Herzegovina by Austria‐Hungary and Austria‐Hungary would support Russia’s efforts to secure free passage to Russian warships into the Mediterranean. Germany’s agreement to support Austria‐Hungary is often cited when holding Germany responsible
for World War I. When Austria‐Hungary declared war against Serbia, Russia did decide to come to the defense of Serbia. Fulfilling its promise to back Austria‐Hungary, Germany declared war on Russia on August 1st and then on Russia’s ally, France on August 3rd. Germany planned to swing through neutral Belgium to attack France from the north where its defenses were the weakest. Great Britain also joined the contest on August 4 because of its moral obligation, especially to France with which it had made secret but informal military arrangements. The trigger for British entry in the war was the German invasion of neutral Belgium. The limited war in the Balkans spread across all of Europe because of the alliance system. In 1915, Italy joined the Triple Entente, thereby betraying its earlier obligations as a member of the Triple Alliance in return for territorial promises made in the secret Treaty of London. In 1917, the United States, which had been neutral, also tilted in favor of Britain because of a shared ancestry
and language. American had stronger economic interests with the Allies (Triple Entente). US had a major reason to be involved in World War I since American public opinion turned against Germany and Central Powers after Germany sank a British passenger ship on May 7, 1915 killing all passengers including 128 American tourists. Eventually, 32 countries on six continents became enmeshed in the conflict. The entry of the United States into the war in 1917 gave the Allies a much‐needed psychological boost, along with fresh forces and material. On the other hand, the Central Powers had no hope of getting fresh supplies. On November 3, 1918, Austria‐Hungary surrendered to the Allies. On November 11, 1918, Germany signed a truce ending the Great War.

Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
The Paris Peace Conference, held at the Palace of Versailles, opened on January 12, 1919, and was attended by the political leaders of 32 countries representing three‐quarters of the world’s population. America’s President Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924), Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Great Britain (1863–1945), Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau of France (1841–1929), and Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando of Italy (1860–1952) were the victorious war leaders that dominated the conference and each had his own objectives. Britain sought to recreate a workable balance of power and safeguard its empire. France sought to dismember Germany and create security for itself in
Europe. Italy sought the territories it had been promised during the war. Wilson sought a forgiving and generous peace with America’s defeated enemies. Wilson sought a liberal world that reflected his Fourteen Points on the basis of which Germany surrendered.

Wilson’s Fourteen Points:
Geopolitical Issues:

Russia should be allowed to operate whatever government it wanted.
Belgium should be evacuated and restored to the situation before the war.
France should have Alsace‐Lorraine and any lands taken away during the war.
The Italian border should be readjusted according to nationality.
The national groups in Europe should be given their independence.
Romania, Montenegro and Serbia should be evacuated and Serbia should have an outlet to the sea.
The people of Turkey should have a say in their future.
Poland should become an independent state with an outlet to the sea.

General Ideology:

Ensuring freedom of the seas
Ending secret treaties and negotiations
Establishing equal and free trade
Reducing arms
Granting self‐governments to the peoples in Central Europe
Establishing League of Nations

However, America’s allies wanted to impose a harsh peace on Germany that would prevent any revival of German military power that might again endanger their security. Britain considered the freedom of the seas as a danger to the British Empire and wanted to make the Germans pay for the war. In the end, Wilson gave over his principles one after the other in order to get the last of them, a league of nations. Wilson’s League of Nations was written into the peace treaty with Germany as the first of 440 articles. The U.S. Senate opposed the treaty, instead signing the Treaty of Berlin with Germany in August 1921. Germany was not invited to attend the peace conference. Germany and the other defeated powers were forced to sign treaties that provided a very different peace than they had anticipated. The finalpeace settlement of Paris consisted of five separate treaties with the defeated nations ‐ Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. In addition to signing the Versailles Treaty with Germany, the victors and the defeated Central Powers signed four other treaties during the meetings: the treaties of St. Germain (with Austria), Trianon (with Hungary), Neuilly (with Bulgaria), and Sevres (with Turkey). The Treaty of Versailles with Germany, signed at Versailles near Paris, on June 28, 1919, was by far the most important. The Treaty of Versailles contained 440 articles. It dealt comprehensively with the territorial, military and war guilt of the Central Powers and the economic, political and other related aspects of the peace settlement. Germany had to accept the blame for starting the War. Germany was asked to surrender nearly 40,000 square kilometers of territory with more than seven million people. Germany was told to pay huge reparations, which after prolonged negotiations were fixed at $33,000 million. German colonies were taken away and were described as ‘Mandated territories of the League’ which France, Britain, and Japan distributed among themselves. Germany and Austria were barred form uniting. Germany had to reduce its army to a hundred thousand men, cut back its navy, and eliminate its air force. Alsace and Lorraine, taken by the Germans from France in 1871, were returned. Sections of eastern Germany were awarded to a new Polish state. German land along both sides of the Rhine was made a demilitarized zone and stripped of all weapons and fortifications. The conference created the League of Nations, the predecessor of today’s United Nations and the organization that gave voice to the idea of collective security. The conference also established the Permanent Court of
International Justice and the International Labour Organisation. The principle of national self‐determination was the most important and durable outcome of the peace conference. As the consequence of World War I and the peace conference, three empires—the Austrian‐ Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman (Turkish) collapsed, and in their place the independent states of Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary were born. The Ottoman Empire was divided into several political entities, including Iraq, Syria, and Palestine, each of which consisted of peoples of different ethnic, religious, and tribal groups. The Treaty also established Yugoslavia, another artificial nation‐state, from remnants of the Austro‐Hungarian Empire.

Negative Arguments regarding the Treaty of Versailles
None of the defeated nations had any say in shaping the treaty. Germany was shocked at the severity of the contradictions between the assurances made when the truce was negotiated and the actual treaty. The desire to punish and permanently weaken Germany gained priority over the quest for a just peace. The Treaty was not based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points as the Germans had been promised it would. The loss of territory and population angered most Germans who believed that the losses were too severe. Germans thought the Treaty was a dictated peace. They had not been invited to the peace conference at Versailles and when the Treaty was presented to them they were threatened with war if they did not sign it. The Germans considered the Treaty of Versailles a harsh
peace. They were especially unhappy with Article 231, the so‐called War Guilt Clause, which declared that Germany (and Austria) were responsible for starting the war. The harsh treatment of Germany prevented the Treaty from creating a lasting peace in Europe. It created anger among Germans who regarded it as unfair. This determination provided the climate for the rise of Hitler and the Nazis and in the end, to World War II. Hence, some scholars claim that the ‘Peace Treaty of Versailles was an imposed Peace’ and the ‘Second World War was started immediately after the settlement of First World War’. The First World War was supposed to be the war to end all war. However, the Treaty of Versailles is often criticized as the ‘Peace to end all Peace’. Germany was imposed to pay $33 billion in reparations that it was not capable of paying. Although economists at the time declared that such a huge sum could never be collected without upsetting international finances, the Allies insisted that Germany be made to pay, and the treaty permitted them to take punitive actions if Germany fell behind in its payments. The rise of fascism in Italy
under Mussolini in 1922 is linked to the fact that Italy was deprived of territories that were promised through a number of secret treaties before the War. The Paris Peace Conference was supposedly guided by the principle of self‐determination. However, the mixtures of peoples in Eastern Europe made it impossible to draw boundaries along neat ethnic lines and compromises had to be made. As a result of compromises, almost every eastern European state was left with ethnic minorities. The problem of ethnic minorities within nations would lead to later conflicts.

Unmin & it’s evaluation

International Relations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed in November 2006.

The United Nation was entrusted with the role of monitoring of arms and armies as per the request contained in a letter jointly sent by the government of Nepal and the then CPN Maoist on 9 August 2006.

UNMIN came to Nepal as a special mission in support of the peace process and to create a free and fair atmosphere for the election of the Constituent Assembly and pursuit of the peace process.

UNMIN was established on 23 January 2007 by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1740.

At the request of the Government of Nepal, the Security Council unanimously extended the tenure of the office for seven consecutive term and finally it was flagged‐down from Nepal on 15 January 2011.

UNMIN mandates

1.monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of the Nepal Army and the Maoist combatants, in line with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of November 2006;

2.assist the parties through a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee (JMCC) in implementing this agreement;

3.assist in the monitoring of ceasefire arrangements;

provide technical assistance to the Election Commission for the election of a Constituent Assembly, which eventually took place in April 2008

There are generally two opposing arguments regarding the role of UNMIN with one side claiming it to be a successful mission while others call it a total failure.

Positive Evaluation

The positive evaluations of the Mission include the support for the election of the Constituent Assembly, hard work for the successful exit of child soldiers from the Maoist cantonments, ensuring cordial atmosphere at the JMCC meetings, and making the political parties abide by peace agreements.

UNMIN played important role in terms of supporting the election of Constituent Assembly held in April 2008 in which the Maoists emerged as the largest party.

UNMIN lent valuable material and expert support for the election

Negative Evaluation:

UNMIN’s role in the election was later criticized with the argument that UNMIN should have advised to not to have the election when one political party still had its own fighting forces.

The verification of the Maoist Combatants was criticized as being deeply flawed. The number of Maoist Combatants who entered cantonments in the beginning of the peace process was 32,250.

After a year‐long verification in the Maoist cantonments, 19,602 were verified by the UNMIN in May2007.

Yet in January 2008, the Maoist chief, Pushpa Kamal Dahal admitted in a subsequently leaked videotape that the actual number of Maoist soldiers had been around 3,500

Out of the 32,250 Combatants, 4,008 were categorized as disqualified by UNMIN for either being minor or late recruits. The disqualified combatants were discharged from the cantonments in January‐February 2010.

Out of 19,602 UNMIN verified combatants, only 17,052 combatants participated during the process of updating and regrouping in November‐December, 2011.

Out of them, 15,608 have already been reintegrated into society as they opted for voluntary retirement and rehabilitation package and training center of Nepal Army. 1,444 combatants selected for integration have recently completed trainings

No significant progress was made for the integration of the combatants during the tenure of UNMIN.

The integration and rehabilitation process remained deadlocked for around four years.

The process moved forward along with Seven Point Agreement signed on 01 November 2011 between the major political parties. By this date, the tenure of UNMIN had already ended.

The Seven Point Agreement paved the way for updating and regrouping Maoist Army Combatants, cheque distribution, closure of cantonments coupled with the Nepal army being given the control over all weapons and ammunitions kept in cantonments.

The UNMIN was criticized for developing pro‐Maoist image.

During a briefing before the UN Security Council in May 2009, UNMIN chief Karin Landgren (who took over from Martin in January 2009) claimed that all the political parties had consented to then‐Prime Minister Dahal’s attempts to dismiss the army chief, Rookmangud Katawal, before backtracking.

UNMIN never recovered from the damage caused by this briefing, and charges of bias intensified thereafter.

There were also questions about UNMIN’s monitoring capacity. In May 2008, a businessman from Kathmandu, Ram Hari Shrestha, had been kidnapped, taken inside a cantonment, tortured and murdered by Maoists combatants and their commander from the Shaktikhor cantonment in Chitwan district right under UNMIN’s nose.

Among many incidents that raised questions over the mission’s monitoring of the cantonments was an incident in Kapilvasu district in August 2009. Nineteen Maoist combatants based in Kapilvastu came out of their cantonment with weapons, and were later arrested.

Nine of the confiscated weapons had been registered by UNMIN, meant only to be used for security on the cantonment perimeter.

UNMIN noted that the combatants had acted against the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.However, the fact that armed combatants from a main cantonment site could have left carrying weapons reinforced the suspicions over UNMIN’s monitoring.

India’s Reservation

India was not very positive regarding UNMIN’s role from the very beginning.
It is said that India was particularly concerned about UNMIN’s role in the integration of Maoist combatants in Nepal Army.
India’s security concerns may be responsible for extreme sensitivity regarding further extension of UNMIN’s mandate.
In India, there were certain sections, who were unhappy about the integration of Nepali army with ideologically indoctrinated Maoist combatants in view of its impact on India.
This seems to be the main reason behind extreme sensitivity on the part of India in involving the UN beyond monitoring to ensure that UNMIN does not have a role in integration of the two armies as envisaged in Comprehensive Peace Accord.

Impact of the cold war

International Relations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

1. Immediate Consequences

Communist Containment, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan

President Harry S. Truman announced the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947.

The containment policy would take necessary diplomatic, economic, and military measures to stop communism from spreading to new areas instead of fighting in the areas that were already communist.

Truman proclaimed that the United States would commit itself to support any nation struggling against “armed minorities or outside pressures.”

U.S. foreign policy thereby formally adopted the Truman Doctrine or the containment policy became a key component of U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War.

In June 1947, U.S. secretary of state George C. Marshall announced a U.S.‐sponsored economic aid program (the Marshall Plan) to help European nations recover from World War II.

The Marshall Plan was generally an attempt to protect Europe from being taken over by the Communists. The Marshall Plan was often considered as the economic weapon of the Truman Doctrine of containment.

By strengthening West European economies, the threat of communism taking hold in the region was diminished.

The Marshall Plan was considered to be successful.

The kellogg briand pact

International Relations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

Background
After the First World War, France did not regard the League of Nations as a guarantee of their security. They wanted to strengthen their defensive system by involving powers beyond Europe on their side. Aristide Briand, the foreign minister of France published an open letter to the US Government in April 1927 proposing a treaty for perpetual peace between France and the United States and also to draw the United States into French defensive system against Germany. The US also had reasons to accept the French proposal. At the end of World War I, U.S. Senate had failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles also established League of Nations. However, the League was not popular in the US because of the economic cost of operation, perceived unfairness of the Treaty of Versailles and unwillingness to get involved in European problems. The United States still came under pressure from its allies in Europe, and from advocates of the League of Nations, to sign some sort of international peace agreement. However, the US did not want to be dragged into a European war on the side of France. Hence, instead of a bilateral agreement between the two nations U.S. secretary of state, Frank Kellogg proposed a multilateral treaty. Kellogg also
wanted the treaty to specifically ban wars of aggression and not acts of self-defense.

Introduction
The Kellogg – Briand Pact is formally known as ‘General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy’, or the ‘Pact of Paris’. The treaty is also known as ‘World Peace Act’. This treaty was an attempt to outlaw international war. It was named for the two men who created it, U.S. secretary of state Frank Kellogg and French foreign minister Aristide Briand. Fifteen nations signed the Kellogg‐Briand Pact in Paris on August 27, 1928: France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The treaty set a date of July 24, 1929, to officially go into effect. By this date, more than 60 nations had signed the treaty. Eventually, it was ratified by 65
states, including Germany, Italy and Japan.

Key Provisions
The treaty contained only three articles.
(i) The signatories renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.
(ii) The contracting parties agreed that settlement of all conflicts, no matter of what origin or nature, that might arise among them should be sought only by pacific means.
(iii) The treaty would remain open for adherence by all the other Powers of the world as long as it may be necessary.
The treaty therefore outlawed war entirely, providing no exceptions to this general prohibition. The parties, however, generally recognized that war would be permissible in the following cases:
(i) for self‐defence
(ii) against any treaty‐breaking State
(iii) in order to carry out responsibilities under the League of Nations and the Locarno Agreements

Several signatories, including the United States, had submitted diplomatic notes prior to the treaty’s ratification indicating their understanding that wars entered into in self‐defense would be lawful. Its most notable feature was the fact that the U.S.A. was one of its signatories, thus recognizing once more its connection with and responsibility towards Europe.

Significance
Although the Kellogg‐Briand Pact did not stop warfare, it did establish an internationally accepted doctrine: Self‐defense is the only legal basis for war. The treaty also established the notion that the territorial acquisition resulting from the use of force are unlawful. The Pact was invoked with some success in the course of territorial dispute between China and the Soviet Union in 1929. The pact served as the legal basis for the creation of the notion of crime against peace ‐ it was for committing this crime that the Nuremberg Tribunal sentenced a number of people responsible for starting World War II. Since there was no expiration date for the treaty, it aimed at outlawing international war permanently. In 1929 Kellogg received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on the treaty.

Negative Arguments regarding The Kellogg – Briand Pact
The parties to the Pact limited its enforcement by registering certain reservations. Britain agreed to sign the pact only as long as Britain could use force within its own colonies. The U.S. Senate insisted that there must be no curtailment of America’s right of self‐defense and that the United States was not compelled to take action against countries that broke the treaty. Kellogg‐Briand contained no sanctions against countries that might breach its provisions. Instead, the treaty was based on the hope that diplomacy and the weight of world opinion would be powerful enough to prevent nations from resorting to the use of force. Without the means to enforce its provisions, the Kellogg‐Briand Pact proved useless in preventing war.
Though Germany, Italy, and Japan were all parties, the treaty did not prevent them from committing aggressions that led to World War II within 14 years of the Treaty’s entry into force. In violation of the Kellogg‐Briand pact, Japan invaded Manchuria, a northern province of China in 1932, and Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935. By 1936 Hitler sent soldiers to occupy the Rhineland, and by 1938 Germany had absorbed Austria. Germany invaded Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939 claiming to act in defense of ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia. In September 1939, the German army invaded Poland.
Though the Pact outlawed all wars, the Pact was interpreted by most of the signatories to permit “defensive” war. However, the treaty did not address the issues of what constituted self‐defense and when self‐defense could lawfully be claimed. It made each nation its own judge of what constitutes ‘self‐defense’. Because of these large loopholes, the Kellogg‐Briand Pact was ultimately an ineffective method for achieving the ambitious and idealistic goal of outlawing war.
Kellogg‐Briand Pact was the result of the search for alternative securities since the League of Nations could not create a feeling of security among the participating states. While this Pact helped the work of the League to maintain peace, some scholars argue that the initiation of the Pact by a few states undermined the League’s principle of security through unity and it created further barrier to the success of the League.
Though the parties to the Pact generally recognized that the war would be permissible to carry out the responsibilities under the League of Nations, in theory, the Pact’s provision of outlawing war in all cases conflicted with the provisions of the Covenant of the League to take military actions against the aggressor. The Pact made no attempts to define ‘aggression’ and the Pact did not contain any provisions of amendment to overcome its limitations.

SAARC

International Relations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

SAARC AND ITS FORMATION
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an economic and political organization of eight countries in Southern Asia. In terms of population, its sphere of influence is the largest of any regional organization: almost 1.5 billion people.

SAARC provides a platform for the peoples of South Asia to work together in the spirit understanding. It aims to accelerate the process of economic and social development in Member States. The upcoming 15th SAARC Summit is being held in the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo on 27-28th July, 2008.

History:

Bangladeshi president Ziaur Rahman first mooted the idea in the 1970’s for creation of a trade bloc, consisting of South Asian countries. The Foreign Secretaries of the seven countries met for the first time in Colombo in April 1981.

The Declaration on South Asian Regional Cooperation was adopted by the Foreign Ministers in 1983 in New Delhi. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was established, when its Charter was formally adopted on December 8 1985.

Member States:

India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives and Bhutan form the principle Member States of the association.

Afghanistan was added to the regional grouping at the behest of India on November 13, 2005, and became a member on April 3, 2007. With the addition of Afghanistan, the total number of member states were raised to eight.

Observers:

In April 2006, the United States of America and South Korea made formal requests to be granted observer status. The European Union also indicated interest in being given observer status, and made a formal request for the same to the SAARC Council of Ministers meeting in July 2006.

On August 2, 2006 the foreign ministers of the SAARC countries agreed in principle to grant observer status to the US, South Korea and the European Union.

Objectives:

To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life.
To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potential;
To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia.
To contribute to mutual trust, understand and appreciation of one another’s problem;
To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields;
To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries;
To strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interest; and
To cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes.

Areas of Cooperation:

At the inception of the Association, the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) consisting of a number of Technical Committees (TCs) was identified as the core areas of cooperation.

The current areas of cooperation under the reconstituted Regional Integrated Programme of Action covers the following areas:

Agriculture and Rural Development
Women, Youth and Children
Environment and Forestry
Science and Technology and Meteorology
Human Resources Development
Transport

Highlevel Working Groups have also been established to strengthen cooperation in the areas of Information and Communications Technology, Biotechnology, Intellectual Property Rights, Tourism, and Energy.

Nuremberg Laws

International Relations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

On September 15, 1935, the Reichstag met in Nuremberg and passed two laws, known as the Nuremberg Laws.
The first, the Reich Citizenship Law, declared that only individuals of “German blood” could be citizens of the German Reich (state), thus depriving German Jews of their citizenship.

The second, the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor, formalized barriers between Jews and Germans, forbidding marriage and sexual relations between Jews and “Aryans.”

Nazis deprived German Jews of all civil rights and social and cultural life.
Jewish property with a view to compelling Jews to emigrate from Germany.
After Germany annexed Austria in March 1938, all the same anti‐Semitic measures were implemented there, year later in Czechoslovakia. By 1938 two‐thirds of German Jews had left the country, and 60 percent of those who stayed had lost their livelihood.

Evacuating the Jews from Germany, the Nazis created compulsory “Jewish Quarters” in most Polish cities and towns known as ghettos. Jews in Poland were forced to move into ghettos.
During the Holocaust, ghettos were small and, in most cases, poor areas in cities and towns, to which the Jews were confined.

Many ghettos were surrounded by walls or fences in order to help enforce the Jews’ isolation and separation from their neighbors and the outside world.
The ghettos were meant to serve as temporary, tightly controlled collection points, where the Jews’ labor potential would be exploited until a future German policy led to their removal.

Ghettos became transition areas, used as collection points for deportation to concentration & death camps.

Beginning of Extermination

In the so‐called euthanasia program, which had begun in the fall of 1939, Nazi doctors killed Germans with mental or physical disabilities.
Following the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, mobile killing units and, later, militarized battalions of Order Police officials, moved behind German lines to carry out mass murder operations against Jews, Roma, and
Soviet state and Communist Party officials.

Between 1941 and 1944, Nazi German authorities deported millions of Jews from Germany, from occupied territories, and from the countries of many of its Axis allies to ghettos and to killing centers, often called
extermination camps, where they were murdered in specially developed gassing facilities.

By 1945, the Germans and their collaborators killed nearly two out of every three European Jews as part of the “Final Solution,” the Nazi policy to murder the Jews of Europe.