TyroCity: International Organizations Notes

ICJ’s Contribution in Development of International Law

International Organizations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

Article 94 establishes the duty of all UN members to comply with decisions of the Court involving them. If parties do not comply, the issue may be taken before the Security Council for enforcement action. There are obvious problems with such a method of enforcement. If the judgment is against one of the permanent five members of the Security Council or its allies, any resolution on enforcement would then be vetoed. This occurred, for example, after the Nicaragua case, when Nicaragua brought the issue of the U.S.’s non-compliance with the Court’s decision before the Security Council.[5] Furthermore, if the Security Council refuses to enforce a judgment against any other state, there is no method of forcing the state to comply. Furthermore, the most effective form to take action for the Security Council, coercive action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, can be justified only if international peace and security are at stake. The Security Council has never done this so far.

The relationship between the ICJ and the Security Council, and the separation of their powers, was considered by the Court in 1992 in the Pan Am case. The Court had to consider an application from Libya for the order of provisional measures to protect its rights, which, it alleged, were being infringed by the threat of economic sanctions by the United Kingdom and United States. The problem was that these sanctions had been authorized by the Security Council, which resulted with a potential conflict between the Chapter VII functions of the Security Council and the judicial function of the Court. The Court decided, by eleven votes to five, that it could not order the requested provisional measures because the rights claimed by Libya, even if legitimate under theMontreal Convention, prima facie could not be regarded as appropriate since the action was ordered by the Security Council. In accordance with Article 103 of the UN Charter, obligations under the Charter took precedence over other treaty obligations. Nevertheless the Court declared the application admissible in 1998.[20] A decision on the merits has not been given since the parties (United Kingdom, United States and Libya) settled the case out of court in 2003.

There was a marked reluctance on the part of a majority of the Court to become involved in a dispute in such a way as to bring it potentially into conflict with the Council. The Court stated in theNicaragua case that there is no necessary inconsistency between action by the Security Council and adjudication by the ICJ. However, where there is room for conflict, the balance appears to be in favor of the Security Council.

Should either party fail “to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court”, the Security Council may be called upon to “make recommendations or decide upon measures” if the Security Council deems such actions necessary. In practice, the Court’s powers have been limited by the unwillingness of the losing party to abide by the Court’s ruling, and by the Security Council’s unwillingness to impose consequences. However, in theory, “so far as the parties to the case are concerned, a judgment of the Court is binding, final and without appeal,” and “by signing the Charter, a State Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with any decision of the International Court of Justice in a case to which it is a party.”

For example, the United States had previously accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction upon its creation in 1946, but in Nicaragua v. United States withdrew its acceptance following the Court’s judgment in 1984 that called on the U.S. to “cease and to refrain” from the “unlawful use of force” against the government of Nicaragua. The Court ruled (with only the American judge dissenting) that the United States was “in breach of its obligation under the Treaty of Friendship with Nicaragua not to use force against Nicaragua” and ordered the United States to pay war reparations.

Examples of contentious cases

A complaint by the United States in 1980 that Iran was detaining American diplomats in Tehran in violation of international law.[21]
A dispute between Tunisia and Libya over the delimitation of the continental shelf between them.[22]
A complaint by Pakistan on behalf of the people of Kashmir over oppression against India and charged it with State terrorism directly continuing violations of the international law.
A dispute over the course of the maritime boundary dividing the U.S. and Canada in the Gulf of Maine area.[23]
A complaint by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization regarding their actions in the Kosovo War. This was denied on 15 December 2004 due to lack of jurisdiction, because the FRY was not a party to the ICJ statute at the time it made the application.[24]
A complaint by the Republic of Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) that Greece is, by vetoing their accession to NATO, in violation of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995[25] between the two countries, was decided in favor of Macedonia on 5 December 2011.[26]

Generally, the Court has been most successful resolving border delineation and the use of oceans and waterways. While the Court has, in some instances, resolved claims by one State espoused on behalf of its nationals, the Court has generally refrained from hearing contentious cases that are political in nature, due in part to its lack of enforcement mechanism and its lack of compulsory jurisdiction. The Court has generally found it did not have jurisdiction to hear cases involving the use of force.

Law applied

When deciding cases, the Court applies international law as summarised in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute provides that in arriving at its decisions the Court shall apply international conventions, international custom, and the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”. It may also refer to academic writing (“the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations”) and previous judicial decisions to help interpret the law, although the Court is not formally bound by its previous decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis. Article 59 makes clear that the common law notion of precedent or stare decisis does not apply to the decisions of the ICJ. The Court’s decision binds only the parties to that particular controversy. Under 38(1)(d), however, the Court may consider its own previous decisions.

If the parties agree, they may also grant the Court the liberty to decide ex aequo et bono (“in justice and fairness”),[27] granting the ICJ the freedom to make an equitable decision based on what is fair under the circumstances. This provision has not been used in the Court’s history. So far the International Court of Justice has dealt with about 130 cases.

Procedure

The ICJ is vested with the power to make its own rules. Court procedure is set out in Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice 1978 (as amended on 29 September 2005).[9]

Cases before the ICJ will follow a standard pattern. The case is lodged by the applicant who files a written memorial setting out the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction and the merits of its claim. The respondent may accept the Court’s jurisdiction and file its own memorial on the merits of the case.

Preliminary objections

A respondent who does not wish to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court may raise Preliminary Objections. Any such objections must be ruled upon before the Court can address the merits of the applicant’s claim. Often a separate public hearing is held on the Preliminary Objections and the Court will render a judgment. Respondents normally file Preliminary Objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and/or the admissibility of the case. Inadmissibility refers to a range of arguments about factors the Court should take into account in deciding jurisdiction; for example, that the issue is not justiciable or that it is not a “legal dispute”.

In addition, objections may be made because all necessary parties are not before the Court. If the case necessarily requires the Court to rule on the rights and obligations of a state that has not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court will not proceed to issue a judgment on the merits. If the Court decides it has jurisdiction and the case is admissible, the respondent will then be required to file a Memorial addressing the merits of the applicant’s claim. Once all written arguments are filed, the Court will hold a public hearing on the merits.

Once a case has been filed, any party (but usually the Applicant) may seek an order from the Court to protect the status quo pending the hearing of the case. Such orders are known as Provisional (or Interim) Measures and are analogous to interlocutory injunctions in United States law. Article 41 of the statute allows the Court to make such orders. The Court must be satisfied to have prima facie jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case before granting provisional measures.

Applications to intervene

In cases where a third state’s interests are affected, that state may be permitted to intervene in the case, and participate as a full party. Under Article 62, a state “with an interest of a legal nature” may apply; however, it is within the Court’s discretion whether or not to allow the intervention. Intervention applications are rare — the first successful application occurred in 1991.

Judgment and remedies

Once deliberation has taken place, the Court will issue a majority opinion. Individual judges may issue separate opinions (if they agree with the outcome reached in the judgment of the court but differ in their reasoning) or dissenting opinions (if they disagree with the majority). No appeal is possible, though any party may ask for the court to clarify if there is a dispute as to the meaning or scope of the court’s judgment.

Criticisms

The International Court has been criticized with respect to its rulings, its procedures, and its authority. As with United Nations criticisms as a whole, many of these criticisms refer more to the general authority assigned to the body by member states through its charter than to specific problems with the composition of judges or their rulings. Major criticisms include:

“Compulsory” jurisdiction is limited to cases where both parties have agreed to submit to its decision, and, as such, instances of aggression tend to be automatically escalated to and adjudicated by the Security Council. According to the sovereignty principle of international law, no nation is superior nor inferior against another. Therefore there is no entity that could force the states into practice of the law or punish the states in case any violation of international law occurs. Therefore, due to the absence of binding force, although there are 191 member states of the ICJ, the members do not necessarily have to accept the jurisdiction. Moreover, the membership of the UN and ICJ does not give the automatic jurisdiction over the member states, but it’s the consent of each states to follow the jurisdiction that matters.
Organizations, private enterprises, and individuals cannot have their cases taken to the International Court, such as to appeal a national supreme court’s ruling. U.N. agencies likewise cannot bring up a case except in advisory opinions (a process initiated by the court and non-binding). Only the states can bring the cases and become the defendants of the cases. This also means that the potential victims of crimes against humanity, such as minor ethnic groups or indigenous peoples.
Other existing international thematic courts, such as the ICC, are not under the umbrella of the International Court. Unlike ICJ, international thematic courts like ICC work independently from United Nations. Such dualistic structure between various international courts sometimes makes it hard for the courts to engage in effective and collective jurisdiction.
The International Court does not enjoy a full separation of powers, with permanent members of the Security Council being able to veto enforcement of even cases to which they consented in advance to be bound.[29] Because the jurisdiction does not have binding force itself, in many cases the instances of aggression are adjudicated by Security Council by adopting a resolution, etc.. Therefore it is very likely for the member states of Security Council to avoid the responsibility brought up by International Court of Justice, as shown in the example of Nicaragua v. United States

Nepal National Commission for UNESCO (NNCU)

International Organizations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

After Nepal was admitted to UNESCO on 1 May 1953 a Nepal Interim National Commission for UNESCO was setup under the Chairmanship of the then Minister for Education on the 26th July 1954. The system of making the Education Secretary as the exofficio Secretary General of the Nepal National Commission for UNESCO demonstrates Nepal’s Commitment to UNESCO. The following are the objectives of the Nepal National Commission for UNESCO, which are manifested in its Constitution 1974 (amendment):

To promote the economic social and intellectual development of the Nepalese People through educational, scientific and cultural activities.
To hold or to encourage to hold seminars, talk programmes, conferences and to promote study and research in the field of education, culture, science, mass communication and social service sectors.
To introduce Nepal’s glorious culture through UNESCO to the world community .
To disseminate and publicize UNESCO objectives and programmes to a wider audience.
To extend co-operation to the programmes conducted by UNESCO at the regional and international levels.
To provide support for the implementation of the national as well as regional projects and programmes conducted in co – operation with UNESCO.

The UNESCO Constitution provides the overarching framework to structure the Nepal National Commission for UNESCO.

According to the Constitution the structure or the frame of NATCOM comprises the following:

Commission
Executive Committee, Subject Committees and Special Committees
Secretariat

Field of Actions

Activities organized by the Nepal National Commission for UNESCO in the following UNESCO related sector.

Education

Education for All (EFA)
School Education
Higher Education
Literacy
Peace Education
Education for Sustainable Development
Education for International Understanding
Gender in Education
ICT in Education

Culture

World Heritage
Cultural Diversity
Tangible Culture
Intangible Culture
Inter Cultural Dialogue

Social Science

Ethics
Human Rights
Poverty Eradication
Democracy

Science

Science and Technology
Science Education
Technology Transfer
Environment
Sustainable Development

Communication and Information

Media Development
Press Freedom
ICT and Mass Communication

The International Court of Justice

International Organizations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

General Features:

The principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Its seat is at the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands).
Began work in 1946, when it replaced the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Operates under a Statute largely similar to that of its predecessor, which is an integral part of the Charter of the United Nations

Functions

To settle in accordance with international law the legal disputes submitted to it by States began work in 1946, when it replaced the Permanent Court of International Justice
To give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized international organs and agencies

Structure

composed of 15 judges elected to nine-year terms of office by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council
It may not include more than one judge of any nationality
They have international personalities do not represent their governments

Working of the Court

Only States may apply to and appear before the Court
Membership is not conditional to UN membership
The Court is competent to entertain a dispute only if the States concerned have accepted its jurisdiction

The Legal Sources of the Court

international treaties and conventions in force
international custom
the general principles of law
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists

Description of WHO

International Organizations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

About WHO

WHO is the directing and coordinating authority for health within the United Nations system. It is responsible for providing leadership on global health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidence-based policy options, providing technical support to countries and monitoring and assessing health trends.

In the 21st century, health is a shared responsibility, involving equitable access to essential care and collective defence against transnational threats.

The role of WHO in public health

WHO fulfils its objectives through its core functions:

providing leadership on matters critical to health and engaging in partnerships where joint action is needed;
shaping the research agenda and stimulating the generation, translation and dissemination of valuable knowledge;
setting norms and standards and promoting and monitoring their implementation;
articulating ethical and evidence-based policy options;
providing technical support, catalysing change, and building sustainable institutional capacity; and
monitoring the health situation and assessing health trends.

These core functions are set out in the 11th General Programme of Work, which provides the framework for organization-wide programme of work, budget, resources and results. Entitled “Engaging for health”, it covers the 10-year period from 2006 to 2015.

The WHO agenda
WHO operates in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing landscape. The boundaries of public health action have become blurred, extending into other sectors that influence health opportunities and outcomes. WHO responds to these challenges using a six-point agenda. The six points address two health objectives, two strategic needs, and two operational approaches. The overall performance of WHO will be measured by the impact of its work on women’s health and health in Africa.

“I want my leadership to be judged by the impact of our work on the health of two populations: women and the people of Africa.”
Dr Margaret Chan, Director-General

More on women’s health and health in Africa

1. Promoting development
During the past decade, health has achieved unprecedented prominence as a key driver of socioeconomic progress, and more resources than ever are being invested in health. Yet poverty continues to contribute to poor health, and poor health anchors large populations in poverty. Health development is directed by the ethical principle of equity: Access to life-saving or health-promoting interventions should not be denied for unfair reasons, including those with economic or social roots. Commitment to this principle ensures that WHO activities aimed at health development give priority to health outcomes in poor, disadvantaged or vulnerable groups. Attainment of the health-related Millennium Development Goals, preventing and treating chronic diseases and addressing the neglected tropical diseases are the cornerstones of the health and development agenda.

2. Fostering health security
Shared vulnerability to health security threats demands collective action. One of the greatest threats to international health security arises from outbreaks of emerging and epidemic-prone diseases. Such outbreaks are occurring in increasing numbers, fuelled by such factors as rapid urbanization, environmental mismanagement, the way food is produced and traded, and the way antibiotics are used and misused. The world’s ability to defend itself collectively against outbreaks has been strengthened since June 2007, when the revised International Health Regulations came into force.

3. Strengthening health systems
For health improvement to operate as a poverty-reduction strategy, health services must reach poor and underserved populations. Health systems in many parts of the world are unable to do so, making the strengthening of health systems a high priority for WHO. Areas being addressed include the provision of adequate numbers of appropriately trained staff, sufficient financing, suitable systems for collecting vital statistics, and access to appropriate technology including essential drugs.

4. Harnessing research, information and evidence
Evidence provides the foundation for setting priorities, defining strategies, and measuring results. WHO generates authoritative health information, in consultation with leading experts, to set norms and standards, articulate evidence-based policy options and monitor the evolving global heath situation.

5. Enhancing partnerships
WHO carries out its work with the support and collaboration of many partners, including UN agencies and other international organizations, donors, civil society and the private sector. WHO uses the strategic power of evidence to encourage partners implementing programmes within countries to align their activities with best technical guidelines and practices, as well as with the priorities established by countries.

6. Improving performance
WHO participates in ongoing reforms aimed at improving its efficiency and effectiveness, both at the international level and within countries. WHO aims to ensure that its strongest asset – its staff – works in an environment that is motivating and rewarding. WHO plans its budget and activities through results-based management, with clear expected results to measure performance at country, regional and international levels.

History of WHO

When diplomats met to form the United Nations in 1945, one of the things they discussed was setting up a global health organization.

WHO’s Constitution came into force on 7 April 1948 – a date we now celebrate every year as World Health Day.

The Failures of the League of Nations

International Organizations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

Article 11 of the League’s Covenant stated:

“Any war of threat of war is a matter of concern to the whole League and the League shall take action that may safe guard peace.”
Therefore, any conflict between nations which ended in war and the victor of one over the other must be considered a League failure.

Italy (1919)

In 1919, Italian nationalists, angered that the “Big Three” had, in their opinion, broken promises to Italy at the Treaty of Versailles, captured the small port of Fiume. This port had been given to Yugoslavia by the Treaty of Versailles. For 15 months, Fiume was governed by an Italian nationalist called d’Annunzio. The newly created League did nothing. The situation was solved by the Italian government who could not accept that d’Annunzio was seemingly more popular than they were – so they bombarded the port of Fiume and enforced a surrender. In all this the League played no part despite the fact that it had just been set up with the specific task of maintaining peace.

Teschen (1919)

Teschen was a small town between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Its main importance was that it had valuable coal mines there which both the Poles and the Czechs wanted. As both were newly created nations, both wanted to make their respective economies as strong as possible and the acquisition of rich coal mines would certainly help in this respect.

In January 1919, Polish and Czech troops fought in the streets of Teschen. Many died. The League was called on to help and decided that the bulk of the town should go to Poland while Czechoslovakia should have one of Teschen’s suburbs. This suburb contained the most valuable coal mines and the Poles refused to accept this decision. Though no more wholesale violence took place, the two countries continued to argue over the issue for the next twenty years.

Vilna (1920)

Many years before 1920, Vilna had been taken over by Russia. Historically, Vilna had been the capital of Lithuania when the state had existed in the Middle Ages. After World War One, Lithuania had been re-established and Vilna seemed the natural choice for its capital.

However, by 1920, 30% of the population was from Poland with Lithuanians only making up 2% of the city’s population. In 1920, the Poles seized Vilna. Lithuania asked for League help but the Poles could not be persuaded to leave the city. Vilna stayed in Polish hands until the outbreak of World War Two. The use of force by the Poles had won.

War between Russia and Poland (1920 to 1921)

In 1920, Poland invaded land held by the Russians. The Poles quickly overwhelmed the Russian army and made a swift advance into Russia. By 1921, the Russians had no choice but to sign the Treaty of Riga which handed over to Poland nearly 80,000 square kilometres of Russian land. This one treaty all but doubled the size of Poland.

What did the League do about this violation of another country by Poland?

The answer is simple – nothing. Russia by 1919 was communist and this “plague from the East” was greatly feared by the West. In fact, Britain, France and America sent troops to attack Russia after the League had been set up. Winston Churchill, the British War Minister, stated openly that the plan was to strangle Communist Russia at birth. Once again, to outsiders, it seemed as if League members were selecting which countries were acceptable and ones which were not. The Allied invasion of Russia was a failure and it only served to make Communist Russia even more antagonistic to the West.

The invasion of the Ruhr (1923)

The Treaty of Versailles had ordered Weimar Germany to pay reparations for war damages. These could either be paid in money or in kind (goods to the value of a set amount) In 1922, the Germans failed to pay an installment. They claimed that they simply could not rather than did not want to. The Allies refused to accept this and the anti-German feeling at this time was still strong. Both the French and the Belgium’s believed that some form of strong action was needed to ‘teach Germany a lesson’.

In 1923, contrary to League rules, the French and the Belgium’s invaded the Ruhr – Germany’s most important industrial zone. Within Europe, France was seen as a senior League member – like Britain – and the anti-German feeling that was felt throughout Europe allowed both France and Belgium to break their own rules as were introduced by the League. Here were two League members clearly breaking League rules and nothing was done about it.

For the League to enforce its will, it needed the support of its major backers in Europe, Britain and France. Yet France was one of the invaders and Britain was a major supporter of her. To other nations, it seemed that if you wanted to break League rules, you could. Few countries criticised what France and Belgium did. But the example they set for others in future years was obvious. The League clearly failed on this occasion, primarily because it was seen to be involved in breaking its own rules.

Italy and Albania (1923)
The border between Italy and Albania was far from clear and the Treaty of Versailles had never really addressed this issue. It was a constant source of irritation between both nations.

In 1923, a mixed nationality survey team was sent out to settle the issue. Whilst travelling to the disputed area, the Italian section of the survey team, became separated from the main party. The five Italians were shot by gunmen who had been in hiding.

Italy accused Greece of planning the whole incident and demanded payment of a large fine. Greece refused to pay up. In response, the Italians sent its navy to the Greek island of Corfu and bombarded the coastline. Greece appealed to the League for help but Italy, lead by Benito Mussolini, persuaded the League via the Conference of Ambassadors, to fine Greece 50 million lire.

The Economic and Social Council

International Organizations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is the UN’s welfare council, which coordinates the economic and social activities.
It seeks to build a world of greater prosperity, stability and justice.
It organizes major international conferences and prepares draft.
The Economic and Social Council, coordinates the economic and social work of the United Nations and the UN family of organizations.
As the central forum for discussing international economic and social issues and for formulating policy recommendations, the Council plays a key role in fostering international cooperation for development.
The Council has 54 members, elected by the General Assembly for three-year terms. It meets throughout the year and holds a major session in July, during which a special meeting of Ministers discusses major economic, social and humanitarian issues.
Each year the General Assembly elects, its one-third, that is 18 members for a period of 3 years

Composition of the International Court of Justice

International Organizations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

The ICJ is composed of fifteen judges elected to nine year terms by the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The election process is set out in Articles 4–19 of the ICJ statute. Elections are staggered with five judges elected every three years, in order to ensure continuity within the court.

Should a judge die in office, the practice has generally been to elect a judge of the same nationality to complete the term. No two may be nationals of the same country. According to Article 9, the membership of the Court is supposed to represent the “main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world”. Essentially, this has meant common law, civil law and socialist law (now post-communist law). Since its creation, four of the five permanent members of the Security Council (France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have always had a judge on the Court. The exception was China (the Republic of China until 1971, the People’s Republic of China from 1971 onwards), which did not have a judge on the Court from 1967–1985, because it did not put forward a candidate. The rule on a geopolitical composition of the bench exists despite the fact that there is no provision for it in the Statute of the ICJ.

Article 6 of the Statute provides that all judges should be “elected regardless of their nationality among persons of high moral character”, who are either qualified for the highest judicial office in their home states or known as lawyers with sufficient competence in international law. Judicial independence is dealt with specifically in Articles 16–18. Judges of the ICJ are not able to hold any other post, nor act as counsel. In practice the Members of the Court have their own interpretation of these rules. This allows them to be involved in outside arbitration and hold professional posts as long as there is no conflict of interest. A judge can be dismissed only by a unanimous vote of other members of the Court.[4] Despite these provisions, the independence of ICJ judges has been questioned. For example, during the Nicaragua Case, the USA issued a communiqué suggesting that it could not present sensitive material to the Court because of the presence of judges from Eastern bloc states.[5]

Judges may deliver joint judgments or give their own separate opinions. Decisions and Advisory Opinions are by majority and, in the event of an equal division, the President’s vote becomes decisive.[6] Judges may also deliver separate dissenting opinions.

Ad hoc judges

Article 31 of the statute sets out a procedure whereby ad hoc judges sit on contentious cases before the Court. This system allows any party to a contentious case to nominate a judge of their choosing. It is possible that as many as seventeen judges may sit on one case.

This system may seem strange when compared with domestic court processes, but its purpose is to encourage states to submit cases to the Court. For example, if a state knows it will have a judicial officer who can participate in deliberation and offer other judges local knowledge and an understanding of the state’s perspective, that state may be more willing to submit to the Court’s jurisdiction. Although this system does not sit well with the judicial nature of the body, it is usually of little practical consequence. Ad hoc judges usually (but not always) vote in favor of the state that appointed them and thus cancel each other out. [7]

Chambers

Generally, the Court sits as full bench, but in the last fifteen years it has on occasion sat as a chamber. Articles 26–29 of the statute allow the Court to form smaller chambers, usually 3 or 5 judges, to hear cases. Two types of chambers are contemplated by Article 26: firstly, chambers for special categories of cases, and second, the formation of ad hoc chambers to hear particular disputes. In 1993 a special chamber was established, under Article 26(1) of the ICJ statute, to deal specifically with environmental matters (although this chamber has never been used).

Ad hoc chambers are more frequently convened. For example, chambers were used to hear the Gulf of Maine Case (Canada/USA).[8] In that case, the parties made clear they would withdraw the case unless the Court appointed judges to the chamber who were acceptable to the parties. Judgments of chambers may have less authority than full Court judgments, or may diminish the proper interpretation of universal international law informed by a variety of cultural and legal perspectives. On the other hand, the use of chambers might encourage greater recourse to the Court and thus enhance international dispute resolution.[9]

Current composition

As of 27 April 2012, the composition of the Court is as follows:[10]

Weakness of The League

International Organizations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

The country, whose president, Woodrow Wilson, had dreamt up the idea of the League – America – refused to join it. As America was the world’s most powerful nation, this was a serious blow to the prestige of the League. However, America’s refusal to join the League, fitted in with her desire to have an isolationist policy throughout the world.

Germany was not allowed to join the League in 1919. As Germany had started the war, according to the Treaty of Versailles, one of her punishments was that she was not considered to be a member of the international community and, therefore, she was not invited to join. This was a great blow to Germany but it also meant that the League could not use whatever strength Germany had to support its campaign against aggressor nations.

Russia was also not allowed to join as in 1917, she had a communist government that generated fear in western Europe, and in 1918, the Russian royal family – the Romanovs – was murdered. Such a country could not be allowed to take its place in the League.

Therefore, three of the world’s most powerful nations (potentially for Russia and Germany) played no part in supporting the League. The two most powerful members were Britain and France – both had suffered financially and militarily during the war – and neither was enthusiastic to get involved in disputes that did not affect western Europe.

Therefore, the League had a fine ideal – to end war for good. However, if an aggressor nation was determined enough to ignore the League’s verbal warnings, all the League could do was enforce economic sanctions and hope that these worked as it had no chance or enforcing its decisions using military might.

The war-time origins of the UN

International Organizations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

The concept of the United Nations developed by stages after the United States entered the war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Already, however, in the previous August, a meeting had taken place between President Franklin Roosevelt and the British prime minister Winston Churchill on board a warship off the Canadian coast. Here the idea of a collective security system for the future post-war world was resurrected. The ‘Atlantic Charter’ which came out of this insisted that ‘all nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force’. To this end it spoke of ‘the establishment of a . . . permanent system of general security’ [Doc. 3, p. 118]. By the beginning of 1942 the twenty-six anti-Axis powers had committed themselves to this declaration and themselves had begun to describe their military alliance as the ‘United Nations’. During the remaining years of the war, ideas for the new peacetime organization developed. They did so, of course, under difficult circumstances. The overriding priority for the allied states was the pursuit of victory. This was the obvious prerequisite for the implementation of any post-war blueprint. Too much speculation on the nature of the new international system would have been a misuse of political energies. Additionally, Roosevelt, who like his First World War predecessor Woodrow Wilson a quarter of a century earlier was at the forefront of thinking about the new institution, was anxious to avoid a repeat of the isolationist backlash at home which had kept America out of the League by focusing too much on its proposed successor. Nevertheless, ideas began to emerge. Roosevelt’s initial thoughts centered on the management of security by the big allied powers after the end of the war: the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and, perhaps, China (Boyd, 1971). This would be made possible by the generalized disarmament of the other states in the international system which would entrust their national security to the collective. Churchill had a more skeptical European perspective on the feasibility of this plan. He was less confident that the necessary cooperation could be achieved and maintained among the big powers. From a more traditionalist perspective he was convinced that states would continue to define their national interests in the same narrow way that had undermined the League’s attempts to implement the earlier plan for collective security. Certainly, the participation of the United States in the new arrangements would be a positive advance, but it would be unlikely to alter the basic approach to national foreign and defense policies ingrained in the attitudes of national leaders across the world. More positively, Churchill was also anxious to avoid the marginalization of the smaller and middle-sized powers which was implicit in Roosevelt’s proposals. The prime minister’s evolving view was that a strong European dimension should be central to post-war Britain’s external relations. As the two world wars had both begun in the center of Europe, it was not perhaps blindly Eurocentric to seek global solutions in a new system of relationships there. He therefore favored a new organization with a predominantly regional rather than global structure. The new body should, ideally, be one in which loose worldwide arrangements acted as an umbrella for strong local inter-governmental institutions (Luard, 1982).

At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, when the tide of the war was clearly turning in the allies’ favor, the Soviet Union was brought fully into the debate. Joseph Stalin was now presented with the American idea of the ‘four policemen’ (the major allied powers) acting as a global coalition able to deploy military enforcement powers at the head of a world assembly. The Soviet leader, like Churchill, was wary of the concentration of power in so few hands and initially shared the British preference for a strong regional dimension to any new security regime. However, Roosevelt warned Stalin that American public opinion, still touched by isolationist attitudes, might resist US involvement in security commitments determined by local states in other parts of the world. If post-war security was to be regionalized, there was no obvious reason why the United States should concern itself with anything other than the western hemisphere. While such a system might enhance Soviet power in eastern Europe, it would tend to limit it at the global level. In view of this, Stalin moved towards the more centralized conception of the Americans (Luard, 1982).

As in the case of the League, it was the Americans who provided the leadership in the construction of the new organization and who pursued their conception in the face of the doubts of the other key actors. On both occasions this situation was no more than a reflection of the balance of power among the respective sets of allies. There was, of course, an irony in this: while the collective security project was designed to remove dangerous national power competition from international relations, it was reliant on the dominating national power of its architect.

It was therefore largely an American plan that was put forward for discussion when allied representatives met to deal with the specifics of the proposed post-war organization in 1944. Meetings took place in between August and October at Dumbarton Oaks, an estate on the edge of Washington, DC. The key negotiators here were the Soviet and British ambassadors to the United States, Andrei Gromyko and Sir Alexander Cadogan, and the American assistant secretary of state, Edward Stettinius, who acted as chairman. Representatives of Nationalist China were also present, though they had a lesser role in the planning process. The objective of the Dumbarton Oaks talks was to reach a consensus among the four powers and then to present the wider anti-Axis alliance with an agreed blueprint for a new global organization.

Agreement was quickly reached on the basic institutional form of the United Nations, largely because the outline model of the League was available to be exploited. There would be a Security Council of eleven members.

(This would be increased to fifteen in the early 1960s to reflect the changing size and membership profile of the organization.) The Council was to consist of the five big anti-Axis powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, China and France (now admitted as a ‘fifth policeman’). These would be permanent members, each with the power of veto over Council decisions. In addition, six (later ten) non-permanent members without power of veto would be appointed on a rolling basis from the various regions of the world represented in the organization. All member states of the United Nations would have a seat in its General Assembly. Both the Council and the Assembly would be serviced by a secretariat of international civil servants.

A nascent system of collective security was also approved at Dumbarton Oaks. In outline this envisaged that disputes between members would in the first instance be settled by processes of negotiation, mediation and conciliation. If these failed, the problem would become the responsibility of the Security Council which would propose its own settlement terms. If this also failed, then the Council could apply economic and other sanctions against the ‘aggressor’ with, in the last resort, recourse to military action. All members of the United Nations would be required to commit themselves legally to undertake such action on the instructions of the Security Council. The Council would itself be advised on the strategic and operational aspects of these measures by a Military Staff Committee (MSC) made up of senior military representatives of its permanent members (Russell, 1958; Yoder, 1997).

Despite these quite wide areas of agreement among the powers, significant points remained at issue after Dumbarton Oaks. Some of these were essentially technical. There was dispute over the extent of the commitments to be required of UN members and the nature of preparedness and earmarking of national forces for UN service. More ominously, a profoundly important issue remained unresolved: the voting system in both General Assembly and Security Council which, by extension, touched on the question of national representation.

In the case of the General Assembly the Soviet Union sought representation for all sixteen of the constituent republics of the USSR. This would obviously have been a misuse of the concept of ‘sovereign equality’ on which the UN was to be based – the principle that all independent states in the international system should have equal rights and powers. The Soviet Union itself and not its component parts was obviously the sovereign power. But the Soviet position was in some ways understandable. Although the world had yet to fall into the extremes of cold war bipolarity between capitalist west and communist east, the rudiments of this global cleavage had been present virtually since the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. It did not take any great prescience on the part of Stalin and his representatives at Dumbarton Oaks to see east–west divisions as a major feature of the post-war international system – and therefore of the new global organization. The Soviet Union was at this time at an obvious disadvantage in terms of simple political arithmetic. The Dumbarton Oaks talks were held before the creation of the so-called ‘people’s democracies’ of eastern Europe and therefore of a communist bloc. The process of European decolonization which would change completely the composition of the United Nations was even further in the future. From the perspective of 1944–45 the USSR would obviously be ideologically isolated in the new organization.

The idea of sovereign equality had a certain moral force in an international system where states were personified as strong and weak individuals. In a world based on collectively secured ‘justice’, the rights of the weak should obviously be as great as those of the strong. But the international system was in reality composed of sovereign states with hugely divergent sizes of population and territory. In this real world, sovereign equality could be seen as fundamentally inequitable and ‘undemocratic’. Why should El Salvador (another founding member of the UN), say, have the same powers in the global polity as the incomparably larger and more populous Soviet Union?

Beyond the General Assembly there were divisions between the Soviet Union and the other big powers over the Security Council veto and the prerogatives of the five permanent members. There was no disagreement on the basic principle. The delegates at Dumbarton Oaks all agreed that the veto was a necessary mechanism. It was in fact an advance on the voting system operated at the League where unanimity was required before any action could be taken. The proposed UN veto was for the permanent members of the Security Council alone and would only be activated by a negative vote, not merely by abstention or absence. The difficulty which emerged at the talks was over restrictions on its use. The British and Americans argued that the veto should not be available to a permanent member when its own behavior was the subject of discussion. Aware of its political vulnerability in an overwhelmingly western institution, the Soviet Union insisted that the veto should be an absolute right of the great powers in all Security Council business other than the purely procedural.

Agreement on both these issues eluded the ambassadors at Dumbarton Oaks. Subsequent attempts to settle them in the remaining months of 1944 were also unsuccessful. The search for an agreement now passed up to the allied foreign ministers and heads of government rather than their ambassadors in Washington. In February 1945 a summit meeting took place at Yalta on Russia’s Black Sea coast. Soviet foreign minister Molotov gave some ground by accepting a restriction on the veto where ‘peaceful settlement’ rather than collective security ‘enforcement’ in issues affecting permanent members were under discussion. With rather more difficulty, a compromise was also reached on the issue of General Assembly representation. It was accepted that the Soviet Union could have two further seats for the republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia. Roosevelt agreed to this only reluctantly, having at one point threatened to demand separate representation for all of the (then) forty-eight states of the United States if Stalin did not give way (Yoder, 1997). These relatively small western concessions, though, were seen as a reasonable price for progress towards the inauguration of the new organization.

This advance on the plans for the new organization was reflected in the final communiqué of the Yalta meeting. Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill pronounced that:

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic, and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present Conference has been able to resolve this difficulty. We have agreed that a conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks. (Yalta Agreement)

In preparation for the San Francisco meeting the presumed permanent members of the new Security Council sent out invitations to fifty states who were then anti-Axis belligerents. This was a status acquired only very recently by some of these countries as the outcome of the war had become plain and the prizes that went with being on the winning side beckoned. This swelled the ranks of founding members, bolstering the ideal of universality of membership. The absence of such universality, it will be recalled, had been a major defect of the League system.

Franklin Roosevelt died ten days before the opening of the San Francisco session but his successor, Harry Truman, immediately affirmed his own and America’s commitment to the new organization. This was greeted with relief among many who had feared a repeat of the isolationist spasm which ended American participation at a similar stage in the development of the League. In reality, however, the prevailing trend in American politics in 1944 and 1945 was if anything anti-isolationist. Roosevelt’s Democratic administration had already worked to ensure a bipartisan approach with the Republicans in Congress. Edward Stettinius, who had led the Dumbarton Oaks talks, had been elevated to the post of secretary of state. He now cooperated closely with the Republicans’ principal foreign affairs adviser (and future secretary of state), John Foster Dulles, who accepted an invitation to participate in the San Francisco conference (Divine, 1974).

Driven on by the ‘big five’, whose authority was enhanced by their leadership of the huge military alliance poised on the verge of final victory in mid-1945, the San Francisco conference (held in the city’s Opera House) confirmed the decisions taken at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta. The structure of the institution, familiar in outline to most of the participants from their League experience, was accepted without dissent. Similarly, the basic constitution of the United Nations, its Charter, was adopted with only marginal and technical modifications. Having been ratified by the five governments of the permanent members, the Charter came into force and the United Nations became a political and legal reality on 24 October 1945.

Atlantic Charter: Anglo- American declaration of August 1941 setting out joint aspirations for the post-war international system including the creation of a new collective security system.

Tehran Conference: Meeting of allied leaders in November 1943 in the capital of Iran, at which early ideas for the creation of a post-war global organization were discussed.

Enforcement measures: Military action designed to secure a predetermined outcome against an aggressor; contrasts with peacekeeping which seeks to manage conflicts rather than force a particular conclusion to them.

Dumbarton Oaks: Washington venue for the planning of the new United Nations by representatives of the major allied powers between August and October 1944.

Veto: The power held by each of the five permanent members in the Security Council individually to prevent action being taken on any non procedural matter with which it might disagree regardless of the position of the majority.

MSC: Military Staff Committee, composed of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council responsible under article 47 of the UN Charter for control of military enforcement actions; never properly operational.

Bipolarity: The configuration of the international system in two dominant, ideologically opposed blocs (or poles); characteristic of the cold war period.

Yalta Conference: Meeting of allied leaders at the Russian Black Sea resort in February 1945 where, among other postwar plans, the proposals which emerged from the Dumbarton Oaks discussions for the new United Nations were discussed at head of government level.

Universality: The principle of open and comprehensive membership of international organizations (a general characteristic of the United Nations).

Introduction to ASEAN

International Organizations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) by the Founding Fathers of ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

Brunei Darussalam then joined on 7 January 1984, Viet Nam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999, making up what is today the ten Member States of ASEAN.

Aims and Purposes

As set out in the ASEAN Declaration, the aims and purposes of ASEAN are:

To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations;
To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;
To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields;
To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres;
To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples;
To promote Southeast Asian studies; and
To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.

Fundamental Principles

In their relations with one another, the ASEAN Member States have adopted the following fundamental principles, as contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) of 1976:

Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations;
The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;
Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner;
Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and
Effective cooperation among themselves.

ASEAN Community

The ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted by the ASEAN Leaders on the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN, agreed on a shared vision of ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies.

At the 9th ASEAN Summit in 2003, the ASEAN Leaders resolved that an ASEAN Community shall be established.

At the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007, the Leaders affirmed their strong commitment to accelerate the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 and signed the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015.

The ASEAN Community is comprised of three pillars, namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Each pillar has its own Blueprint, and, together with the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Strategic Framework and IAI Work Plan Phase II (2009-2015), they form the Roadmap for and ASEAN Community 2009-2015.

ASEAN Charter

The ASEAN Charter serves as a firm foundation in achieving the ASEAN Community by providing legal status and institutional framework for ASEAN. It also codifies ASEAN norms, rules and values; sets clear targets for ASEAN; and presents accountability and compliance.

The ASEAN Charter entered into force on 15 December 2008. A gathering of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers was held at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta to mark this very historic occasion for ASEAN.

With the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN will henceforth operate under a new legal framework and establish a number of new organs to boost its community-building process.

In effect, the ASEAN Charter has become a legally binding agreement among the 10 ASEAN Member States.

ASEAN Motto

The motto of ASEAN is “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”.

Specialized Agencies of the UN

International Organizations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

Autonomous organizations joined to the UN through special agreements

ILO (International Labour Organization)
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN)
UNESCO (UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)
WHO (World Health Organization)
World Bank group
IMF (International Monetary Fund)
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization)
UPU (Universal Postal Union)
ITU (International Telecommunication Union)
WMO (World Meteorological Organization)
IMO (International Maritime Organization)
WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization)
IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development)
UNIDO (UN Industrial Development Organization)
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)

Introduction to SAARC

International Organizations — Sun, 18 Aug 2013 05:41:42 +0000

In the late 1970’s, president Ziaur Rahman, proposed the creation of trade bloc consisting of South Asian countries. The Bangladeshi proposal was accepted by India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka during meeting held in Colombo in 1981. In August 1983, the leaders adopted the Declaration on South Asian Regional Cooperation during a summit which was held in New Delhi

The heads of Seven South Asian Countries of SAARC (Bangladeshi, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) signed the charter to establish the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) on December 8th, 1985.

Afghanistan joined SAARC as a Member at the Fourteenth SAARC Summit, Delhi, April 2007.

SAARC is unique concept of regional cooperation. with very distinct geographical, cultural, environmental diversity, the SAARC member states compress of the worlds highest mountains, land locked mountains terrains to deltaic low line flood – prone areas and one of the smallest low line island nation in the world.

With the world’s most populous country, SAARC is home to nearly 1.5billion people or about 22% of world’s population

SAARC Secretariat

The SAARC secretariat was established in Kathmandu on 16th January 1987. It’s role is to coordinate and monitor the implementation of SAARC activities, service the meetings of the association and serve as the channel of communication between SAARC and the international organization

The secretariat comprises the Secretary General, Eight Directors and the general service staffs.

On the SAARC Charter Day all member states hold celebration rise public awareness of the commitment of governments to the SAARC process and to highlight some of the principal activities and the work of the association. Statements are issued by the Member States and the Secretary General to commemorate SAARC Charter Day.

SAARC Conventions

SAARC Convention on Combating and Prevention of Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution

Convention on Promotion of Welfare of Children

Convention on Mutual Assistance on Criminal Matters, July 2008

SAARC Conventionon Narcotics Drugs

SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism

Additional Protocol on Terrorism, Jan 2004

Agreements

Agreement for establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council
Final Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation
Final Agreement on Customs Matters
CHARTER OF SDF 31 July 2008
Agreement on establishing the SAARC food bank
Agreement on south Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)
Agreement on the Establishment of South Asian Regional Standards Organisation (SARSO)
Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation

SAARC Summit

The Charter (Article III) provides that the Heads of State or Government “shall meet once a year or more often as and when considered necessary by the Member States”.

However, the Summit has generally been convened at an interval of one and half year or so. The next i.e. Sixteenth Summit of the Heads of State or Government would be held at Thimphu on 28-29 April 2010.

Summit Declarations provide directives and mandate for regional co-operation. Following are the past Summit Declarations:

First SAARC Summit, Dhaka, 1985
Second SAARC Summit, Bangalore, 1986
Third SAARC Summit, Kathmandu, 1987
Fourth Summit, Islambad, 1988
Fifth SAARC Summit, Male’, 1990
Sixth SAARC Summit, Colombo, 1991
Seventh SAARC Summit. Dhaka, 1993
Eighth SAARC Summit, New Delhi 1995
Ninth SAARC Summit, Male’, 1997
Tenth SAARC Summit, Colombo, 1998
Eleventh SAARC Summit, Kathmandu, 2002
Twelfth SAARC Summit, Islamabad, 2004
Thirteenth SAARC Summit, Dhaka, 2005
Fourteenth SAARC Summit, New Delhi, 2007
Fifteenth SAARC Summit, Colombo, 2008
Sixteenth SAARC Summit, Thimphu, 2010

Ministerial Declarations

Ministerial Declaration on Global Economic Crisis
Colombo Statement on Children of South Asia
Declaration on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism
Islamabad Declaration on Health, 2005
Colombo Declaration on a Common Environment Programe
Common Position on Climate Change, Nov. 1998
Rawalpindi Resolution on Children of South Asia, Aug. 1996
New Delhi Declaration of Environment Ministers, Apr, 1997
Declaration of Commerce Ministers, May 1998